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Prospects for Nuclear Non-Proliferation: 
An Actor-Based Case Study of Iran’s Nuclear Future 
 
James Martin Lockwood 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime and analyze theories for effectively analyzing countries that 
are a risk for proliferating nuclear armaments.  The initial phase of my research is 
designed to assess the existing literature and primary theoretical approaches for 
analyzing nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and potential nuclear proliferators.  
My main means of analysis will be to examine the national and international 
actors involved in each case.  With this method, I plan to analyze a government at 
the level of each of its ruling institutions.  Each of these institutions will be 
analyzed in the context of Joseph Cirincione’s five drivers and barriers: security, 
prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics.  This study will then 
review multiple historical cases of countries and treaties related to the nuclear 
non-proliferation issue in the context of my method of analysis.  In particular, 
each historical study will discuss major actors and institutions with respect to the 
five major proliferation concepts, as a means of demonstrating the validity of my 
method.  The primary section of my thesis will be the application of my method to 
one of the preeminent nuclear proliferation threats today: Iran.  After a discussion 
 iii 
of the physical status of Iran’s nuclear program, I will begin my analysis in terms 
of my concepts, and will examine the principal actors involved in the Iranian 
nuclear dispute.  These will be the Iran’s moderate and conservative factions, as 
well as the U.S., Israel, the EU-3, and IAEA, and they will be examined in the 
context of the five drivers and barriers.  The final section will be my overall risk 
analysis for Iran.  My preliminary analysis is that regime survival is the most 
critical issue when it comes to the principal motivations of a state to develop 
nuclear arms.  If this is correct, policy options designed to take advantage of the 
actors’ positions in Iran can be formulated based on the specific conditions that 
prevail in Iran. 
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Chapter I-Introduction: 
 This thesis has been written to try and determine potential solutions to the 
nuclear proliferation issue, and to examine the topic to explore new theoretical 
approaches for ways to not only to allow for more comprehensive means of 
nuclear arms reduction, but also ways to improve means of nuclear non-
proliferation (stopping development of nuclear arms before they become an 
issue), which would make reduction of existing arms easier and less time critical.  
With this in mind, this study will be conducted as a theoretical comparison of 
global methods of non-proliferation as opposed to targeted policies designed to 
affect specific states or regions, and more specifically, to examine the viability of 
using an institutional and actor based approach in this analysis (as opposed to a 
strictly governmental analysis).  The central case study of this proposed targeted 
area method is a country at the forefront of the nuclear proliferation issue: Iran.  
This country has the potential to pose a serious challenge to the non-proliferation 
regime, and has repeatedly defied both international opinion and U.N. mandate by 
obfuscating the facts about its nuclear program and purchasing components over 
the black market.  Its bellicose language concerning Israel and the United States 
and ambitions to become the hegemonic power in the Middle East raise further 
concerns about the results if Iran does develop atomic arms. 
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 The case of Iran is important for a number of reasons.  Iran is already a 
major regional player in the Middle East, and the development of a nuclear 
program by the Middle East would have a large number of significant effects.  
Development of an Iranian nuclear weapon would signal demonstrate the 
weakness of the existing non-proliferation regime, and cast significant doubt on 
American ability to contain the spread of nuclear weapons.  This could also lead 
to the expansion of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East to deter Iran, 
which would lead to an extremely dangerous multi-polar nuclear standoff in what 
is arguably the world’s most volatile region.  Finally, development of Iranian 
nuclear arms would dramatically reduce American credibility in the region to 
provide security, and could cause a sharp drop in American influence throughout 
the Middle East.  However, while the United States stands to lose a great deal by 
the development of an Iranian nuclear option, Iran itself stands to lose more.  
Development of its nuclear option would likely isolate Iran, cause the United 
Nations to invoke sanctions, and risk a military intervention from the international 
community.  Iran’s pursuit of the full nuclear fuel cycle when there is little benefit 
and massive cost involved has continued to confuse diplomats and analysts, and 
the same is true of North Korea.  This work seeks to answer one central question: 
Can analysis of the major national and international actors in a given nuclear 
proliferation scenario help determine why nuclear proliferator states pursue 
nuclear weapons in defiance of all conventional logic?  The initial hypothesis of 
this work is that such states will pursue nuclear programs if that state believes that 
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a nuclear option is vital to the survival of its regime, regardless of the potential 
international consequences.  If this is true, it should demonstrate the ability to 
formulate an effective policy approach to containing a particular proliferator state.  
To do this, both historical examples of challenges to the non-proliferation regime 
and the current case study of Iran will first be broken down into the main actors 
involved in the crisis.  By examining the relationships between these actors, it 
should be possible to determine the overall principal motivators for a country to 
produce nuclear weapons in spite of overwhelming international objections.  For 
instance, the belief by the North Korean government that its nuclear weapons are 
necessary to deter American military would suggest that security would be a 
principal motivator.  This is a simplistic example, but demonstrates the concept.  
By examining how all of these actors interact within a set framework of accepted 
motivators (and inhibitors) to developing nuclear arms, it is possible to determine 
the overall impetus for that country to develop its nuclear program.  Once this is 
complete, knowledge of a state’s individual motivations, issues, actors, and 
conditions will allow for the formulation of a direct policy option for dealing with 
the problem state. 
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Chapter II-Literature Review: 
 Three primary works lie at the foundation of this thesis’ approach.  These 
are Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons by Joseph 
Cirincione, The Future of Arms Control by Michael Levi and Michael O’Hanlon, 
and The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices by 
Kurt Campbell, Michael Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss.  All of these books attempt 
to cover different approaches of the nuclear proliferation issue, and when taken 
together, they complement each other quite well.  Cirincione’s book discusses the 
various means by which states choose whether to pursue nuclear arms, how these 
factors stem from the various institutions within a nation-state, and how the 
various drivers and barriers within these institutions can result in an overall 
decision by a nation state to arm itself or not.  These drivers and barriers are 
placed into five categories: Security, Prestige, Domestic Politics, Technology, and 
Economics.1
                                                 
1 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York City: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), Pg. 49. 
  This follows an extensive historical study of nuclear arms and arms 
control.  Levi and O’Hanlon’s book focuses more on policy options than root 
causes of nuclear issues, and discusses means by which the United States and the 
United Nations can create a new arms control framework, as Cold War forms of 
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arms control are no longer considered viable in the modern era.2  This book 
provides separate potential policies for both arms reduction and arms counter-
proliferation under a number of circumstances, and strongly advocates a central 
American role in the improvement of the NPT regime.  Finally, Campbell, 
Einhorn, and Reiss’ book can in many ways be considered an extension of 
Cirincione’s book, as it looks at historical and institutional factors that drive states 
to seek nuclear arms.  The section of the book that stands out, however, is its 
series of case studies on states that have historically chosen to forgo nuclear arms 
(such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea), all of which describe in 
detail the reasons that those states did not pursue nuclear arms.  These case 
studies are exhaustive chronicles of the internal and external issues and actors that 
influenced each case.  However, these analyses are mostly of secondary cases (i.e. 
countries that risk becoming proliferators in response to a neighboring state 
developing nuclear arms) and are generally security oriented in terms of analyzing 
motive.  The book also provides extensive historical background as to the 
previous failures (and successes) of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.3
 However, before discussing how these books complement one another, I 
feel it is necessary to compare the characteristics of their studies on this issue.  
First among these is a strongly U.S.-centered approach to all three of these books.  
This is particularly notable in Levi and O’Hanlon’s book, and nearly all of their 
 
                                                 
2 Michael A. Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), Pgs. 1-19. 
3 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why 
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 
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suggested policy options require U.S. leadership and in some cases unilateral 
American action on the issue (such as a voluntary de-emphasis of nuclear arms in 
the American arsenal).4  Cirincione also states a similar conclusion, claiming that 
decisive leadership by an American president is required to return energy to the 
issue, and that the support of an active and well informed public is required for 
such a president to lead the international community on the issue.5  Campbell, 
Einhorn, and Reiss also put the United States at the core of the non-proliferation, 
but discuss it in a different manner.  The failings of previous American non-
proliferation efforts are discussed at length, in addition to the risks of states under 
U.S. protection (such as Taiwan or South Korea) if there is any erosion in the 
confidence that the U.S. will defend those countries in a time of conflict.6
 Another difference in approach between these works is the emphasis on 
historical study in the writing.  On the one hand, Levi and O’Hanlon have very 
little historical background within their book, looking instead to future policy 
  Thus, 
this book’s call for American leadership on the issue is more indirect, but it is 
certainly evident.  A common theme of all of these books is the idea that 
American exceptionalism on the nuclear issue (meaning the idea that the United 
States can, to a certain degree, retain its massive nuclear arsenal while it calls for 
everyone else to disarm) has to be done away with if there is ever to be any major 
progress on the non-proliferation issue on the global scale. 
                                                 
4 Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 72-73. 
5 Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 158-182. 
6 Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 
Choices, Pgs 20-30. 
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options (after all, the book is titled The Future of Arms Control).  The only 
portion of the book that could be considered a historical analysis is a discussion of 
traditional, Cold War era arms control initiatives provided for comparative 
analysis.7  By contrast, Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss take an almost entirely 
historical approach to their work, as their case studies are all historical works 
seeking to use past events to try and describe the possibilities for those countries 
obtaining nuclear arms.8  Furthermore, there is also a brief discussion of the 
failures of existing nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policies, and how 
these failures may have led to the unstable nuclear world we live in today.9  
Cirincione’s book falls somewhere in between, as he utilizes the first three 
chapters of his book for historical study, emphasizing in them the events that led 
to the creation of the atomic bomb, the arms race, and the Cold War.10
                                                 
7 Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 19-46. 
  He 
chooses a very individual, actor-oriented approach, attempting to describe the 
mentalities of people in each phase of the bomb’s development and evolution.  
This is critical to his institutional theoretical approach in terms of describing the 
drivers and barriers for nuclear development, as institutions are made up of 
people, and understanding the mentality of people in each institution is necessary 
for understanding the behavior of that institution as a whole. 
8 Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 
Choices, Pgs 43-313. 
9 Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 
Choices, Pgs 20-30. 
10 Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 1-48. 
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 Another area where these three works differ is the scope of their inquiries.  
Cirincione takes the broadest theoretical approach, in my opinion.  His discussion 
of the drivers and barriers for nuclear development is largely theoretical, with 
very broad application on the global level, but there is little discussion as to 
applications for specific countries.  Some brief examples are provided, but are not 
extensive case studies.  By contrast, Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss take a much 
narrower approach, utilizing several smaller, narrower inquiries that are defined 
by the issues of the country they study more than any broad theoretical emphasis.  
Rather than trying to create an overall framework, they examine each country at 
the micro-level (such as prominent individuals, security issues and economic 
factors specific to each country) and investigate each country’s reasons and 
rationale for considering development of nuclear arms, as well as the barrier and 
other mitigating factor.  However, the lack of a unified framework does leave 
some inconsistencies among the case studies.  Levi and O’Hanlon’s approach is 
primarily theoretical, but also rather narrow, as it primarily focuses on future arms 
control policy rather than the root issues that cause nuclear proliferation (a 
corrective approach rather than a preventative approach), with only a short 
chapter detailed to discussing the control of existing arsenals.11
                                                 
11 Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 47-73. 
  This could be 
considered a major failing of the book, as it can be very easily argued that if a 
country can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear arms early on, then there is little 
need to consider a corrective approach.  However, this is somewhat forgivable 
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given the degree of nuclear arms that already exist in today’s international 
environment, and the need for new initiatives to reduce them. 
 The political orientations of the authors also seem to have affected their 
approaches and conclusions.  This is important because it can define the overall 
goal the authors want to achieve in their works, and to what degree they feel the 
nuclear issue is solvable.  The most conservative of these works is Levi and 
O’Hanlon’s book.  They express the belief that nuclear weapons cannot be 
completely eliminated, and this belief results in their focus on new means of arms 
control and an aggressive non-proliferation regime.12  Conversely, Cirincione 
takes a much more liberal viewpoint in his line of inquiry, as he flatly states that 
he believes a nuclear-free world is a possibility and one that could be 
implemented in the near future.13
                                                 
12 Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pg. 14. 
  This, along with his critical assessment of the 
various actors that led to the arms race and the Cold War, demonstrates a much 
more liberal mind at work in the authoring of that book.  Of the three works, 
Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss’ book seems to be the most impartial, as it devotes 
itself more to the case studies and historical reviews.  While the authors clearly 
express disappointment in the failures of the existing non-proliferation regime, 
there are few real clues that reveal the political orientation of the writers.  In that 
regard, it does very well at remaining a much more analytical piece, dedicated to 
historical research on the issue. 
13 Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 181-182. 
 10 
 Finally, the last point of comparison and contrast should be the overall 
goals of the writers in their books, which stems from their political orientation, 
and all three of these vary significantly.  Cirincione is very clear about what he 
feels the goal of his work is: To bring about the elimination of nuclear arms 
altogether.  His work is focused almost exclusively on determining what measures 
need to be brought about from the human standpoint in order to make that a 
reality.  However, this goal is both overly ambitious and idealistic, and I feel that 
could have some effect on the credibility of his policy suggestions, although I feel 
that his methods of analysis remain sound.  The complete opposite approach is 
taken in Levi and O’Hanlon’s book.  They take a much more realist approach in 
defining their goal, which is restricting access to nuclear arms for those states that 
do not have them and bringing about significant arms reductions for those states 
that do.  Many would likely find this to be a more pragmatic and reasonable goal, 
at least for the near future.  Furthermore, adequately addressing the issue 
American nuclear exceptionalism further adds credibility to their work.  As for 
Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, it is more difficult to assess an overall goal for 
their work, given the multi-tiered nature of the book.  Overall, I surmise that they 
seek to offer an expose on several at-risk states, with a degree of general policy 
suggestions for each one.  Furthermore, discussion of the failings of previous non-
proliferation regimes suggests that they seek to demonstrate these faults while 
allowing those in power to formulate new approaches on their own.  However, it 
is difficult to determine whether or not they feel a nuclear-free world is possible, 
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or if they share in the more realist viewpoint.  As it stands, it can only be said that 
all wish to stabilize the nuclear proliferation situation before the chance to do so is 
gone. 
 In relation to this writing, these pieces provide the units for analysis that 
are central to determining the central driving forces behind nuclear proliferators.  
The drivers listed by Cirincione are critical to this, as they provide an established 
set of probable motives to compare to in both historical and current cases.  The 
cases studies used by Campbell et al provide an effective framework applying 
these drivers and barriers in the real world, by demonstrating how they apply to 
the actors in a given situation and how they affect the outcome within a country.  
Finally, Levi and O’Hanlon provide a strong framework for determining how to 
exploit these motivations for a given country.  All of these linked approaches are 
necessary for determining who the principal actors involved in a nuclear 
proliferation situation are, what their principle motivations and drivers are in 
seeking nuclear arms, and how they can be deterred, countered, or contained. 
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Chapter III-Theoretical Review: 
 With all of these factors in mind, it is then possible to determine how these 
works can be combined into a strong theoretical method for analyzing risk states 
which can be used for case studies.  These differing areas of emphasis for each 
book allow for a comprehensive theoretical approach for creating effective 
policies for fomenting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on a state by 
state basis, particularly when taken in a specific order.  Cirinicione’s book 
provides the baseline for the entire inquiry, with his discussion of the drivers and 
barriers for developing, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear arms analyzed 
at an institutional level.  Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss’ case study approach then 
allows these drivers and barriers to be applied comparatively at the state level, 
which allows for individual states to be assessed and then compared as potential 
nuclear proliferation risks.  Finally, Levi and O’Hanlon’s book discusses possible 
ways to formulate policy based on both the country in question and the specific 
factors within that country that cause it to be considered an at-risk state.  These 
policy options can then be further divided into policies concerning the reduction 
of existing nuclear arms and those concerning the implementation of an effective 
non-proliferation regime for those countries that do not yet have them.  By 
combining the strong points of these different theoretical approaches, it should be 
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possible to create a strong, coherent means of analyzing the level of risk a 
potential nuclear state poses, then devising a policy method for reducing or 
eliminating that risk factor. 
 This brings the paper to the primary theoretical discussion of this writing.  
By examining the various nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, it is possible to 
separate these initiatives into two primary categories.  These are the large scale 
category and the small scale (or area specific) category.  The large scale approach 
is most familiar, as it encompasses large, landmark initiatives such as the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  These initiatives are massive, landmark pieces 
of international legislation that are designed to dramatically alter the entire 
international system, and often address issues that are considered to be of global 
importance.  As their name suggests, they are intended to be accepted and 
followed by large numbers of countries as a means of putting global interests 
above national interests.  Their aims are often as ambitious as their scope, often 
seeking to control or prohibit a form of national behavior that can cause harm to 
international peace and prosperity (such as the development of nuclear arms).  
One of the greatest advantages of a large scale initiative is that it can define the 
international standard for a particular issue, which often helps gain further 
acceptance of the initiative (as most countries do not like to be considered 
outcasts).  The NPT is an excellent example of this, as it has helped define the 
overall global standard towards nuclear weapons (that they need to be reduced or 
 14 
eliminated), and has led to the notion that states who develop nuclear arms in 
violation of the agreement are pariahs and should be dealt with as such14
 However, these initiatives do have several disadvantages as well.  First 
and foremost, no such initiative has ever been totally and completely ratified by 
every country in the world.  Even the most broadly successful initiatives, such as 
the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) have small numbers of holdouts who refuse to sign 
the treaties.
. 
15
                                                 
14 “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.,” May 2005, United Nations, 
  Most of these countries do not sign because they believe that 
following the provisions of the treaty will gravely compromise their national 
security.  Unfortunately, most of these security concerns are theoretically well 
founded (at least in regards to the NPT and the nuclear issue).  The prime 
examples are India, Pakistan, and Israel.  Israel’s past experiences with its 
neighbors (to say nothing of the current proliferation issues with Iran) have 
dictated that the country refrain from signing the NPT, even though it has not 
openly declared that it is a nuclear power.  The India and Pakistan issue is also 
widely known, as neither will sign the NPT unless the other does.  Additionally, 
unless there is an overwhelming outpouring of support for a particular issue, a 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html 
(accessed November, 2009). 
15  “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.,” United Nations. 
“Convention on the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.”  U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2001, 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/bwc1.html (accessed November, 2009). 
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention),” Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2008, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ 
(accessed November, 2009). 
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large scale initiative will often take a considerable amount of time to gain enough 
signatories to be effective.  For instance, the Ottawa Convention on Landmines 
has taken more than ten years to gather the 156 countries that have currently 
signed or acceded to it, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been open 
for signature since May 2008, and only received the thirty ratifications it needs to 
enter into force in February 2010 (the treaty will not actually enter into force until 
August 2010).16
 Furthermore, another issue with many large scale initiatives is that there is 
a lack of a solid disincentive for not signing the treaty or withdrawing from the 
treaty.  This is a glaring weakness in the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC, and this 
was demonstrated when North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.  While 
North Korea has had sanctions imposed upon it by the UN, the NPT text itself 
provides no recourse in the event a country withdraws from or violates the treaty.  
Lack of a formal “stick”, so to speak, could render the initiative ineffective.  
North Korea proceeding to detonate a nuclear device after withdrawing from the 
treaty without incurring any sort of censure beyond economic sanctions does not, 
in my opinion, set a good precedent for other countries that may be interested in 
  Therefore, unless there is a pressing need for such drastic global 
measures, such initiatives can take years or even decades to become significant 
and effective in the global community. 
                                                 
16 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.”, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, February 
2010, http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages/English 
(accessed March 2010). 
“Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Convention on Cluster Munitions, February 2010, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/index.php (accessed March 2, 2010). 
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acquiring nuclear arms.  If other countries such as Iran choose to follow suit, the 
entire NPT regime could easily be in jeopardy. 
 My main focus will be on the small scale/area style of nuclear arms 
reductions.  The small scale/area specific type of initiative is the opposite 
approach from a global initiative, as these initiatives are designed to influence the 
behavior of a specific country.  In the context of nuclear non-proliferation, these 
are typically subdivided into two categories.  The first is preventative, which is 
designed to restrict a country’s ability to develop nuclear arms and to demonstrate 
to the country in question the downsides of developing nuclear capability and 
alienating the international community.  The second is corrective, which is 
designed to persuade a country that has developed nuclear arms to give them up.  
Military and non-military variations of both exist, and both preventive and 
corrective forms of these initiatives have been implemented.  The isolation of 
South Africa and the economic sanction put in place on North Korea are good 
examples of this sort of initiative. 
As its stands, the vast majority of modern nation states have already 
chosen whether or not to abide by the terms of the NPT, and further global 
initiatives on the issue will accomplish little to forestall those states who do want 
to acquire nuclear arsenals.  This is why the area-specific methods of preventing 
the acquisition of nuclear arms or reducing existing arsenals are important.  This 
allows for a tailored approach that addresses the specific actors and conditions of 
a given country.  This allows for a specific set of policies to be implemented to 
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either reduce that country’s risk for developing nuclear arms or containing and 
isolating it after it has developed nuclear arms.  The entire Cold War era arms 
control regime could be considered an area specific form of counter-proliferation, 
as nearly all of the treaties and initiatives that were discussed and/or negotiated 
were designed specifically to reduce arsenals of nuclear arms between NATO and 
the Soviet Union (with notable exceptions being the NPT, BWC, and CWC).  In 
terms of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) began 
the elimination of many of the nuclear weapons in the United States and Soviet 
Union.17
                                                 
17 Amy F. Woolf, “91139: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START Iand II): Verification and 
Compliance Issues.,” Congressional Research Service, November 22, 1996, 
  More modern area specific initiatives include the six-party talks with 
North Korea over their nuclear program, the economic sanctions levied against 
Iran and North Korea in response to building up their programs, the years of 
sanctions and inspections that successfully prevented Iraq from developing 
nuclear arms (which was discovered to be the case following Operation Iraqi 
Freedom), and the lifting of sanctions against Libya when they publically 
dismantled their WMD programs.  These examples help demonstrate that area-
specific initiatives can vary significantly depending on the actors in question.  The 
Libyan example demonstrates an example of successful diplomacy in a non-
proliferation initiative, through years of careful negotiations among the actors to 
reach a specific solution for both Tripoli and Washington. 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/91-139.htm (accessed December, 2009). 
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 This study intends to take the area-specific study and examine each of the 
national and international institutions actors involved in a specific area of interest.  
The goal is to determine the most common motivators for a state to pursue nuclear 
weapons, and the best means to do this is to examine both the national and 
international actors involved in a given scenario.  Once the interactions of the 
various national and international actors in a situation is examined, it is possible 
to derive their motivations and interests in seeking nuclear arms as a means of 
gaining leverage over the other actors.  Determining their motives then allows for 
the formulation of a direct policy option that can be carried out to reduce the risk 
posed by the state threatening to become a proliferator.  This idea derives its roots 
from the work of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a renowned statistician and social 
scientist.  Bueno De Mesquita’s work involves the use of game theory to 
determine the outcomes of a wide variety of international situations.18
                                                 
18 Clive Thompson, “Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb?” New York Times, 
August 12, 2009. 
  The core 
of Bueno de Mesquita’s work is game theory, which is a derivative of rational 
choice theory, and specializes in performing predictive analyses.  Using a 
computer model, Bueno de Mesquita generates a numerical value that correlates 
to particular outcome for a particular event and/or actor.  He prides himself on his 
model’s ability to generate precise outcomes rather than vague predictions that 
mean little.  Moreover, he claims that his isolation of specific events and actors 
allows for the modification of the models outcome, as the model can demonstrate 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-
t.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Bueno%20de%20Mesquita&st=cse (accessed September, 2009). 
 19 
what effects different interactions will have.  Bueno de Mesquita claims that his 
models have accuracy greater than 90%, and in many cases has made more 
accurate predictions than analysts at the government intelligence agencies on a 
given issue.  He is a strong proponent of use of this system in more decision 
making, both for governments and corporations, and feels that the science of 
human decision making would be greatly enhanced by adopting his model and the 
theory behind it.19
 However, Bueno de Mesquita’s model is not ideal for this study for a 
number of reasons.  First of all, access to the model is proprietary to Bueno de 
Mesquita and access to it is unlikely.  Additionally, Bueno de Mesquita’s main 
premise (and the main premise of rational choice theory as a whole) that human 
actors are entirely predictable and will always make actions based upon self 
interest and rational decision making without regard to personal principles and 
societal norms has been hotly debated and repeatedly questioned.  More 
specifically, his use of computer models to predict human decision making are 
also controversial, in spite of their success rate.
 
20
 However, what Bueno de Mesquita’s analysis does prove is that a micro 
level analysis of actors and institutions is an effective means of determining the 
  Finally, it is always difficult to 
quantify the positions of various actors through numerical values on an issue 
without such figures being entirely arbitrary. 
                                                 
19 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The Predictioneer's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self Interest to 
See and Shape the Future (New York: Random House, 2009), pgs. 9-13. 
20 Clive Thompson, “Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb?” New York Times. 
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specific risks that are characteristic of nuclear proliferation states, and it shows 
how predictions can be influenced.  My proposal is to break an at-risk state into 
the most prominent actors both inside and outside the target state, and analyze 
their positions on the nuclear issue in regards to the various drivers and barriers 
for nuclear development.  By taking this micro-level approach tailoring 
international policy towards risk states based on the individual conditions 
prevailing in each state, it allows for the implementation of nonproliferation 
policies that address the opinions and interests of the unique actors in each state.  
This is the primary goal of this study: To take the institutions and actors (both 
national and international) that are the main influences in an at-risk state, 
determine the characteristics associated with each actor and institution, and 
compare these characteristics between the actors to determine how that risk state 
might be dissuaded, interdicted, or even forcibly prevented from gaining nuclear 
arms.  Each actor will be analyzed using the five drivers and barriers presented in 
Cirincione’s work.  These individual analyses will then be combined to try and 
determine what the most compelling drivers for nuclear proliferation are, and 
what policy options are the best to contain proliferators.   
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Chapter IV-Historical Review: 
 Before discussing an ongoing case such as Iran, it is necessary to discuss 
this study’s theory in the context of several historical cases, both of the successes 
and the failures of the existing non-proliferation regime.  These examples are 
designed to demonstrate how the various actors involved in each of these 
situations interacted, and how their actions resulted in either a positive outcome or 
a negative outcome.  These historical cases have been selected to provide a solid 
historical comparison to Iran’s case after conducting the primary case study.  
They have also been selected to demonstrate which drivers are the most 
compelling for a state that is developing nuclear weapons, and which barriers are 
the most effective at deterring a state from developing nuclear arms (or getting 
them to reverse their decision to produce nuclear arms if they have already 
started).  They are highly diverse, spanning multiple regions and multiple 
cultures, and are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of an analysis using 
the actors and the five drivers/barriers without running afoul of issues such as 
cultural or political biases that could be derived from studying risk states in a 
single region.  They have also been selected due to their highly public nature, and 
a great deal of information is available about all of these cases, which makes the 
analysis of their actors and drivers both simpler and more effective. 
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Overview of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
 Before discussing the successes and failures of the nonproliferation 
regime, it is first important to discuss the foundations of this regime: the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Currently only three countries in the world (India, 
Pakistan, and Israel) have never signed the treaty, making it one of the most 
widely signed international treaties in history.  Of the countries that have signed 
the NPT, only North Korea has ever withdrawn from it.  This treaty has defined 
the global attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear energy since its 
inceptions, and those countries that have not complied with it have often been 
ostracized by the international community.  Its influence cannot be understated, 
but many believe that its future may be in doubt. 
 The concept for the treaty began shortly after the end of World War II, 
when it became apparent that the pursuit of nuclear energy and technology would 
put the world at risk for nuclear arms proliferation.  However, principal 
negotiations on the treaty did not begin until 1957, and the negotiations picked up 
quickly during the 1960s.  The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is not listed as a 
motivator for the treaty, but the timing would suggest that the nuclear war scare 
caused most countries to examine the potential risks of having a nuclear arsenal.  
The treaty was put into effect in 1968, and it was decided that it would be put up 
for review every twenty-five years.  At the first review conference in 1995, it was 
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decided that the treaty would be extended indefinitely, and that reviews would be 
held every five years afterward.21
 The treaty is divided into eleven articles.  Article I directs any member 
state not to transfer nuclear arms or control of nuclear arms to any non-nuclear 
weapon states, and not to encourage any non-nuclear weapons state to construct 
nuclear arms.  Article II directs any state party to the treaty not to accept the 
transfer of nuclear arms or accept assistance in developing nuclear arms, and not 
seek the purchase or manufacture of nuclear arms through any means.  Article III 
establishes the International Atomic Energy Agency as the primary nuclear 
safeguards authority, and states the means by which states party to the treaty 
conclude agreements with the IAEA.  Article IV establishes each state’s right to 
peaceful nuclear energy, and the right to render assistance to any other country 
party to the treaty in the development of peaceful nuclear energy.  Article V 
discusses the usage of “peaceful nuclear explosives” and that their potential 
applications and use should be monitored and overviewed by the other states party 
to the treaty.  Article VI calls for the existing nuclear weapon states to begin 
negotiations to bring an early end to the nuclear arms race, and to seek the 
disarmament of their nuclear arsenals.  Article VII establishes each signatory 
state’s right to form regional treaties to establish the total absence of nuclear arms 
in those regions.  Article VIII establishes the procedures for proposing and voting 
on amendments to the articles of the treaty.  Article IX establishes the procedures 
 
                                                 
21 “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.”  The United Nations. May 2005. 
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for signing and ratifying the treaty.  Article X provides the procedures for 
withdrawing from the treaty, and states have the right to withdraw from the treaty 
if extraordinary events jeopardize their supreme interests.  It has to give notice to 
the U.N. Security Council and all other parties to the treaty of its withdrawal three 
months in advance.  Article X also establishes that reviews of the treaty should be 
held every twenty-five years, although this has since been amended to a review 
every five years.  Article XI establishes the archival procedures for the treaty.22
 The treaty’s mandate is to provide all of the member states with the means 
to pursue nuclear energy, while prohibiting the production of nuclear arms and 
eliminating existing arsenals.  This treaty is also attributed with setting the global 
attitude towards nuclear arms, and beginning the series of nuclear disarmament 
talks between the United States and Soviet Union during the later years of the 
Cold War.
 
23  However, there have been significant problems with the treaty.  First 
among these was India’s refusal to sign the treaty when it was first put into force, 
claiming that the treaty was discriminatory.24
                                                 
22 “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” The United Nations, May 2005. 
  North Korea’s withdrawal from the 
NPT has further compromised the treaty’s integrity.  Many question whether the 
treaty will endure over the coming years.  Both the upcoming 2010 Review 
Conference and Iran’s behavior will likely determine the outcome of the NPT 
regime. 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html (accessed April 4, 2010) 
23 “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.”  The United Nation, May 2005. 
24 “India Nuclear Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org, April 28, 2005, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/nuke.htm (accessed March 2, 2010). 
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Successes of the Non-Proliferation Regime: 
South Africa 
 South Africa is quite possibly the best example of a country choosing of 
its own accord to accede to the NPT regime.  In 1993, South African President de 
Klerk publicly revealed the South African nuclear program.  In addition to 
disclosing the program, de Klerk also announced the deactivation of both the 
program and the six warheads it had produced.25
The actors and institutions involved in the South African nuclear program 
evolved and changed considerably over the course of the program, illustrating the 
need for determining the important actors in present-day nuclear risk states.  
During the early phases of the program under the Atomic Energy Board (AEB), 
the South African nuclear program qualified under the Peaceful Nuclear 
  In addition, all South African 
nuclear facilities were made available for IAEA inspection and the entire program 
was verified as disabled prior to South Africa signing the NPT.  South Africa’s 
unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program is a unique event in global 
politics, and is the only time a country has willingly revoked its nuclear arms after 
having developed them, and is truly the best example of the success of the NPT. 
                                                 
25 “South Africa: Nuclear Weapons Progam,” GlobalSecurity.org, April 28, 2005, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rsa/nuke.htm (accessed February 6, 2010). 
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Explosives (PNE) program, and was actually being examined for use in mining.26 
However, South Africa’s deteriorating security environment led to major changes 
in the South African defense establishment.  This followed strong negative 
reactions from the United States and Soviet Union to the nuclear program as well.  
These changes included the reorganization of the AEB into the Atomic Energy 
Corporation (AEC), which was tasked with the production of atomic weapons.27  
This was further exacerbated by the Arms Corporation of South Africa (Armscor), 
which was the chief arms manufacturer in South Africa and a strong proponent of 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent force for the South Africa.28  Also notable was 
change in government leadership.  President de Klerk, in spite of being reputed as 
a “hawk”, quickly took steps to disarm South Africa’s nuclear program, which 
was a significant change in policy from his predecessors.  In the face of 
potentially serious opposition from the military, he went ahead with the 
immediate elimination of South Africa’s nuclear capability.29
                                                 
26David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, 
no. 4 (July/August 1994): page 41, 
  Additionally, 
international actors had a very strong influence on the outcome in South Africa.  
The U.N.’s economic sanctions (resulting from the South African nuclear 
program) were one of the principal means of getting South Africa to disarm, and 
http://books.google.com/books?id=VAwAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA37&dq#v=onepage&q=&f=false 
(accessed March 2, 2010). 
27 Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” page 37. 
28 Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” page 37. 
29 Frank V. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lesson's for U.S. Nonproliferation 
Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1995): page 10., 
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/31pabian.pdf (accessed February 14, 2010). 
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the IAEA was responsible for both the inspections and reporting the openness that 
the South Africans displayed in dismantling their nuclear program. 
 The drivers for South Africa’s nuclear problem evolved over time based 
on the changing geopolitics.  Initially, the program was seen more as a means to 
demonstrate South Africa’s technological capability to build the bomb, in addition 
to the prestige that came with becoming a nuclear state, particularly during the 
U.S. Atoms for Peace and Peaceful Nuclear Explosives programs.30  Economics 
also drove the South African decision to pursue the nuclear program, as the AEC 
stood to benefit from being able to provide both nuclear power and various forms 
of enriched uranium to various customers.  However, external security quickly 
trumped all other concerns for South Africa’s nuclear program as the 1960s 
progressed.  Following the signing of the NPT, greater pressure was applied to 
South Africa from the United States.  The country’s non-compliance with the 
NPT and practice of apartheid eventually led to total isolation from most of the 
global community.  Furthermore, ongoing clashes with a Soviet and Cuban 
supported Angolan army in Namibia further worried the South African 
government.  This in turn led to the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, fed 
by uranium mined domestically, an underground test shaft in the Kalahari Desert, 
the test detonation that occurred in the Indian Ocean in 1979, and eventually the 
six gun barrel-type nuclear weapons created.31
                                                 
30 Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” page 41. 
 
31 Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lesson's for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 
pg 3. 
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 If South Africa went to all the trouble to defy the international community 
and develop an indigenous nuclear program, then what factors could persuade the 
country to radically reverse its policy and completely dismantle its program?  
Details are unclear, but interestingly enough, security again appears to be the 
primary factor in South Africa choosing to dismantle its nuclear program.  The 
elimination of South Africa’s regional threats resulted in a drastic shift in opinion 
of South African foreign policy makers, and it was quickly decided that 
elimination of their weapons was in South Africa’s security interests.  The 
conflicts with Angola in Namibia reached their peak in 1988, with tens of 
thousands of troops on both sides poised to fight at the South African border.  The 
military stalemate opened the way for negotiations between the parties, eventually 
resulting in a ceasefire.32  The breakup of the Soviet Union also removed South 
Africa’s other major security concern, since there would no longer be Soviet units 
and advisors in Africa spreading the influence of the Warsaw Pact.  Domestic 
politics and prestige also played a part in the dismantlement.  President de Klerk 
made dismantlement of the program and ending apartheid immediate priorities 
upon his election, and elimination of the nuclear warheads prevented their misuse 
by extremist elements in the country who did not agree with his agenda.33
                                                                                                                                     
“South Africa: Nuclear Case Closed?” National Security Archive, December 1993, 
 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa34.pdf  (accessed February 12, 2010). 
32 Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lesson's for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 
page 10. 
33 Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lesson's for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 
page 10. 
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 Today, South Africa is a major proponent of nuclear disarmament and a 
strong supporter of the NPT.  The country has remained free of nuclear arms and 
weapons grade uranium since acceding to the NPT.  That being said, there are still 
the potential for serious issues with the South African nuclear program.  The 
country retains its entire nuclear industry and fuel cycle, and could easily resume 
production of weapons grade uranium if the need arises.  Now, this would involve 
leaving the NPT, but as long as the country cites “supreme circumstances” or at 
least gives 90 days notice, any country can withdraw from the treaty without any 
penalty in the context of the NPT.34
 
  As a practical matter, there would likely be 
an enormous diplomatic backlash, the results of which are impossible to predict 
(given that North Korea was entirely isolated for its program, but India and 
Pakistan were not).  Regardless of the outcome, South Africa could still redevelop 
its weapons at very short notice if there was a drastic change in South African 
foreign policy. 
Libya 
 One of the most surprising cases of a country choosing disarmament is 
that of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya.  Under Qaddafi’s leadership, Libya had 
gained a reputation as a rogue, isolationist state throughout the Cold War era, due 
to its support of terrorism (including the Lockerbie bombing in 1988)35
                                                 
34 “South Africa: Nuclear Weapons Progam,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
, repeated 
35 Flynt Leverett, Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb, New York Times, January 23, 2004. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/23/opinion/why-libya-gave-up-on-the-
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military skirmishes with the United States, and most importantly, its ongoing 
efforts to produce nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as procuring the 
ballistic launchers from North Korea to deliver them.36  In December 2003, 
however, Qaddafi stunned the world by announcing his intent to unilaterally end 
Libya’s WMD programs, following months of secret negotiations with the United 
States.  While Libya never developed a working nuclear weapon, it did have an 
active chemical weapons program as well as several ballistic launchers, and has 
since eliminated or turned all of these over to the United States (it does retain a 
small ballistic missile capability).37
Unlike South Africa, Libya’s case appears to be more homogenous at the 
state level.  There is very little information available about the command structure 
of the Libyan WMD programs, so it is difficult to determine the positions of the 
Libyan institutions on the nuclear issue.  This is unsurprising, given the extremely 
centralized and somewhat paranoid nature of the Libyan government, which is 
built entirely around the leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi.
 
38
                                                                                                                                     
bomb.html?scp=1&sq=Why%20Libya%20Gave%20up%20on%20the%20Bomb&st=cse
  His repeated 
suppression of dissent and of any group that seeks to undermine his regime 
(including Fundamentalist Muslims, private businesses, and even his own 
military) is in line with the popular image of Libya as a state built around one 
 
(accessed March 11, 2010). 
36 “Libya: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.org, November, 21, 2008, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm (accessed March 11, 2010). 
37 “Libya Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library, January, 2010, 
http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/index.html (accessed March 11, 2010). 
38 “Background Note: Libya,” U.S. Department of State, February, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm (accessed March 11, 2010). 
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man’s cult of personality.39  Given the evident lack of institutional differences in 
the Libyan government (at least on the nuclear issue), the principle institutions 
and actors in this scenario have been at the international level.  These included the 
Libyan government, the United States government, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, and the United Nations.  The actors and policies of the U.S. 
government in particular played a key role in giving Libya the opportunity to 
renounce its weapons of mass destruction.  When Libya made clear its intention to 
come to the negotiating table, the Bush Administration’s neo-conservatives were 
left out of the loop, allowing the administration to take a more moderate approach 
than when dealing with states such as Iran and Syria.40
 The drivers for Libya’s WMD programs were not all that dissimilar from 
South Africa’s.  The primary driver again appears to be security; although 
Qaddafi’s often contradictory statements on the issue make a definitive 
conclusion difficult to come by.  However, Israel appears to be the main security 
concern for the Libyans at the time, as Qaddafi made repeated statements 
  This meant that the U.S. 
was willing to make concessions to the Libyans in exchange for disarming (as 
opposed to the Bush Administration’s demands that Syria and Iran unilaterally 
renounce nuclear weapons), and is arguably what allowed Libya to go ahead with 
its disarmament plan. 
                                                 
39 “Background Note: Libya,” U.S. Department of State. 
40 Samuel Salama, “Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?” 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_56a.html (accessed 
March 11, 2010). 
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expressing his concern about Israel’s nuclear arsenal.41  It’s also probable that 
there were security concerns with Chad, which Libya had several border clashes 
with, and it had even used some of its chemical weapons against Chad during the 
1980s.42  Libya had also shown interest in purchasing technology for nuclear 
power stations from the Soviets and Belgians as well.43
 By contrast, Libya had a number of barriers in a number of categories to 
the development of its nuclear program, which ultimately led to the abandonment 
of its program.  Although economics had little to do with Libya’s development of 
the bomb, they had a great deal to do with why they abandoned the program.  
There are indications going back as far as the end of the Clinton administration 
that Libya was becoming interested in trading its WMD programs for an end to 
sanctions against the country, which were having a marked effect on the Libyan 
economy by dramatically reducing Libyan oil exports.
  However, there is no 
other evidence that economics was a significant driver in the development of the 
Libyan nuclear program.  Prestige and domestic politics are also a possibility, but 
no corroborating evidence exists. 
44  Furthermore, Libya had 
to buy most of its outside expertise, which would further increase the effect of 
sanctions on slowing the program.45
                                                 
41 “Libya: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
  Security seems to be the second most 
significant factor in the Libyan decision to abandon WMDs, and there are two 
notable events that stand out.  The first of these was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
42 “Libya Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library. 
43 “Libya: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
44 Salama, “Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?” 
45 “Libya: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
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March 2003, which many argue provided a strong example of the U.S. response to 
rogue states thought to be developing weapons of mass destruction.46  The second 
was the October 2003 seizure of a German cargo ship by the U.S. Navy in the 
Mediterranean Sea.47  The ship was loaded with uranium enrichment components, 
including parts for hundreds of centrifuges, and was bound for Tripoli.  It has not 
been revealed what the source of the parts was, but it seems likely that Qaddafi 
did not want to risk a U.S. military response to the seizure, and decided to cut his 
losses.  Prestige also seems a notable factor, as Qaddafi has gained a great deal of 
international praise for abandoning his program (again, much like South Africa), 
and it seems likely that Qaddafi knew that what sort of positive treatment he 
would receive from the international community.48
  Interestingly, Libya is probably an even lower risk for nuclear 
rearmament than South Africa is today.  Given Libya’s complete lack of nuclear 
industry, the country would have no means to produce a weapon if there was a 
radical change in Libyan politics.  Furthermore, the amount of time and 
diplomatic energy Libya has spent normalizing relations with the United States by 
eliminating its arsenal would militate against Libya reversing its decision to 
eliminate its WMD.  The level of transparency Libya has allowed regarding the 
inspection of its former WMD facilities and its ballistic weapons reinforces 
further suggests that Libya is more interested in returning to the mainstream in 
 
                                                 
46 Salama, “Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?” 
47 “Libya: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
48 Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb” New York Times, January 23, 2004. 
Salama, “Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?” 
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international politics than keeping nuclear arms.  Barring an extreme reversal of 
policy (or an involuntary change of government), it would seem that Libya is 
unlikely to reverse its WMD policy as long as it continues to reap the benefits of 
abandoning its program. 
 
Successful Disarmament Treaties: START and INF 
 An international agreement can also be examined in the context of the 
principal actors involved, and there are also a number of interesting characteristics 
that can be examined to see what makes for an effective nuclear arms control 
treaty.  Arguably the most effective of these treaties are the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).  
Both of these treaties resulted in drastic reductions in both the Soviet and 
American nuclear arsenals, and remain historic in their scope, the length of time 
required to negotiate them, and lasting effects they have had on strategic policy of 
the United States and Russia in the years since their signing and ratification. 
 The INF treaty has been one of the most far reaching arms control 
agreements ever reached.  While its scope is fairly narrow, it is the only arms 
control treaty to ever eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms for the 
participants.49
                                                 
49 “Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State, 
January 20, 2001, 
  As the name suggests, these were Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs).  The idea for 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf1.html (accessed March 13, 
2010). 
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the treaty began following the deployment of the Russian SS-20 advanced IRBM 
in the European theater.  As NATO and the USSR began deploying more 
intermediate and shorter range weapons in the area (of more advanced design), 
both sides began to come forward with offers of reducing INF in both countries, 
and eventually eliminating them.  President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev 
signed the agreement in September of 1987, and immediately entered into force.  
One of the other defining characteristics of the treaty was its extremely thorough 
in its verification techniques to ensure both sides dismantled their INF weapons.50
 The highly intrusive means of verification provided by the treaty is one of 
the reasons for its success.  These included not only remote inspection by satellite, 
but also on site inspections of relevant nuclear facilities.
 
51  While the START 
treaty also covers such inspections, INF has the most invasive inspection regime, 
and strongly encourages compliance.  Furthermore, it remains in full effect today.  
The treaty’s primary driver seems to be, strangely enough, security.  Both sides 
feared the build up of arms in the region enough to come to the table.  To be 
entirely fair, the U.S. hedged its bets with the development of its Pershing I and II 
IRBMs and nuclear tipped GLCMs in Europe, but was equally interested in the 
disarmament talks.52
                                                 
50 “Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State. 
 
51 “Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State. 
52 “Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State. 
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 Unlike the INF treaty, the START I treaty has a much broader scope, and 
while it hasn’t achieved the feat INF has in eliminating all weapons covered under 
its purview, it has still been a dramatic success.53  It reduced all strategic nuclear 
warheads on each side to 6,000, with 1,600 strategic delivery systems.  These 
delivery systems included Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine 
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers.54  The treaty was 
signed in 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Interestingly, the 
treaty was successfully multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and 
all of the successor states complied with the terms (including the total 
disarmament of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan).55  While it is unclear exactly 
how close Russia and the United States came to meeting START I’s guidelines, 
arsenals were significantly reduced, and as of 1996, both sides were ahead of their 
timetables on the elimination of their armaments.56  Furthermore, the treaty has 
proven so successful that both the United States and Russia chose to continue 
abiding by its terms even after its expiration in December 2009.57
                                                 
53 Woolf, “91139: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II): Verification and 
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SORT treaty.  The long term effects of this treaty remain to be seen, but they 
could lead to a new era of nuclear cooperation between the two states.58
 While the drivers of the START treaty are not clear, it can be inferred that 
they are similar to those of INF, since the treaties were negotiated simultaneously.  
This suggests that both sides began to regard their nuclear arsenals as a security 
liability rather than an asset.  This is further evidenced by the complete 
elimination of the nuclear arsenals in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.  
However, there are some barriers to certain parts of its implementation.  Since the 
treaty covers strategic weapons (which require significant and expensive 
infrastructure to deploy and maintain), some of the Soviet successor states have 
had issues complying with some of the more stringent facility elimination 
requirements.  In spite of its various issues, it remains a very successful treaty and 
the gold standard for arms control treaties. 
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Failures of the Nonproliferation Regime: 
North Korea 
 Arguably the greatest failure of the NPT has been its inability to 
effectively prevent North Korea’s efforts produce nuclear arms.  North Korea is 
the only case of a country withdrawing from the NPT after signing it, and it then 
proceeded to make an indigenous nuclear program (culminating in an attempted 
test detonation) in total defiance of the international community.  Furthermore, 
there has been a complete lack of strong international response to the program 
during the Clinton and second Bush administrations.  This incident illustrates the 
lack of serious international response and the inability of the NPT to provide 
disincentives for states that ignore the treaty. 
Once again, the principal actors in this situation are international actors, 
given the highly monolithic North Korean government, which is widely known 
for basing itself entirely around the personality of its leader.  Thus, the principle 
actors have been the United States, North Korea, Russia, China, the UN, the 
IAEA, South Korea, and Japan.  The positions of these actors have dictated the 
evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, with South Korea and Japan in the 
most threatened position by a belligerent, nuclear armed North Korea, while the 
United States, Russia, and China are forced to play the peacekeepers, all of whom 
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have different angles on the crisis.  However, this is changing.  During the most 
recent nuclear tests in mid-2009, Russia and China joined the American 
condemnation of the program, and China (historically the strongest supporter of 
the DPRK on the UN Security Council) has recently taken steps such as allowing 
the seizure of North Korean funds in Macao.59  Furthermore, there may be 
additional complications in analyzing the North Korean state, as it may not be 
possible to treat it as a monolithic entity for much longer.  Following Kim Jong-
Il’s stroke in 2008, reports indicate that a succession struggle has begun in North 
Korea, in the event that his health continues to decline.60
 North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons dates back to the 1950s, but it 
was not until the 1990s that North Korea’s nuclear program became a serious 
concern.
  While it is unclear who 
may be vying for leadership after Kim Jong-Il or who their supporters might be, it 
will certainly become complicated as more actors become relevant in an 
impoverished, isolated, nuclear armed country with a history of aggression. 
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spent nuclear fuel rods into plutonium, and it appears to have received technical 
aid from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network in the late 1990s.62  The other 
major concern is the North Korean ballistic missile inventory, which features an 
extremely large stockpile of ballistic missiles that can be fitted with nuclear 
warheads.  These include Soviet designed Scud-Bs and –Cs, as well as 
indigenously designed Nodong and Taepodong missiles.63  However, there is still 
no concrete information on what nuclear warheads may be in the North Korean 
arsenal, and to what degree they have been weaponized.  It should also be noted 
that the principle concern with the North Korean program is not as much a direct 
nuclear assault by the DPRK (which would likely result in a devastating nuclear 
response from the United States) but rather that the DPRK would sell its nuclear 
weapons or nuclear material in exchange for much needed hard currency.64
 Nearly all sources agree that the drivers for North Korea’s nuclear 
program are security and economics.  Security appears to be the more prominent 
driver of the two in the North Korean case.  North Korea first characterized its 
“nuclear deterrent force” as a policy bargaining chip in 2003, and has repeatedly 
claimed that it was developing nuclear arms to for self defense and to defy U.S. 
sanctions and nuclear threats.
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nuclear program as a means of forcing the United States reengage with North 
Korea, and trying to pull a non-aggression agreement out of the U.S.  
Unfortunately, the situation is getting worse as North Korea’s language has 
become more belligerent in recent times, as a result of growing Russian and 
Chinese irritation with the lack of predictability of the DPRK and its continued 
defiance of the international community.66  Economics have also been a driver for 
North Korea’s nuclear program, but not in the conventional sense (i.e. being able 
to produce nuclear energy for sale).  Instead, North Korea has been more 
interested in using the program as a bargaining chip to have U.N. sanctions lifted 
and gain economic cooperation with Japan and South Korea.67  However, as 
relations have progressively worsened, especially in 2009, the security argument 
appears to be taking a greater priority for the North Korean government.  The 
nuclear and ballistic weapons are used to provide “scientific nationalism” to the 
people of North Korea, as evidence of Korean military might and scientific 
progress.  This complements a tremendous amount of propaganda proclaiming the 
necessity of the military above all else, which discourages dissent and keeps the 
Korean populace focused on external threats instead of their own problems.68
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the regime feels its domestic legitimacy is threatened and public discontent is a 
possibility, it will be less likely to give up its nuclear arms. 
 As for barriers, economics and technology appear to be the main inhibiting 
factors for the North Korean nuclear program.  In terms of nuclear technology, 
North Korea’s nuclear facilities are lacking in sophistication and many of them 
are outdated.  Furthermore, most of their major nuclear facilities are unfinished 
and years away from completion, which significantly limits their ability to 
produce weapons and fissile material.69  Furthermore, it is also estimated that 
their ability to produce highly enriched uranium weapons is less advanced than 
their plutonium production capabilities.70  In terms of economics, the continuing 
sanctions severely limit North Korea’s ability to purchase the equipment for their 
nuclear industry, and this will be particularly true if the United States decides to 
enforce its legal authority to inspect North Korean ships at sea.71  However, these 
barriers are still relatively minor, as they only prevent large scale production of 
atomic devices.  It is still believed that they already have several devices in their 
arsenal, with the capability to build more.72
 North Korea presents an extreme risk not just to its regional neighbors, but 
also to the NPT regime as a whole.  It has set the unsettling precedent that the 
NPT can be withdrawn from at will with no recourse except sanctions, and may 
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well serve to encourage countries such as Iran to proceed with development of 
their own nuclear arsenals.  North Korea’s potential to become a nuclear 
marketplace presents an even greater hazard, which could allow for the 
acquisition of nuclear arms by other countries or even terrorist groups.  With all 
of this in mind, North Korea could be a disaster of tremendous proportions for the 
future of nonproliferation, depending on how this emerging nuclear power is 
managed over the coming years. 
 
India and Pakistan 
 The nuclear standoff on the Indian sub-continent has been its own Cold 
War since both countries declared their nuclear arms capability in the late 1990s.  
This situation could easily be considered as much of a nonproliferation disaster as 
North Korea, but for a few different reasons.  Neither country signed the NPT, 
since India claimed it was discriminatory and Pakistan would not sign if India did 
not sign it first.  It also highlights the lack of commitment the existing nuclear 
states have towards disarming their own nuclear arsenals, and the dismissal of the 
issue in the face of other political issues (such as the War on Terror).  
Additionally, the internal problems in Pakistan present an opportunity for 
terrorists and other non-state actors to steal or outright buy nuclear arms.  As a 
result, many analysts view the entire region as a primed nuclear powder keg.  
Given how closely interrelated these two countries’ nuclear weapon programs are, 
these states will be reviewed together. 
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 Clearly, the two primary actors are India and Pakistan in this particular 
case.  However, unlike North Korea, these are not monolithic countries centered 
on the ideology of one leader.  India’s case in particular is rife with actors with 
different positions and views on the nuclear issue, and the evolution of the issue 
has changed with the actors involved.73  Pakistan’s drive for a nuclear weapon 
was more widely agreed upon by the Pakistani’s (as they felt their own survival 
was threatened by Indian nuclear arms), but there were specific actors in the 
country that were responsible for the development of its nuclear arms.  Dr. Abdul 
Qadeer Khan is one of the most notable of these, as he spearheaded the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program from the scientific side.74  The major international 
actors in this particular case were the United States and the United Nations, given 
the lack of involvement of the IAEA.  The United States in particular had a great 
deal of responsibility for its lack of any effective response to the growing nuclear 
issue during the Clinton and second Bush administrations.  Sanctions on both 
sides were light (and most of those were later lifted), which did little to impede 
the development of nuclear arms on either side.75
 The nuclear developments of both sides date back to the signing of the 
NPT in 1968, with India as the catalyst.  India declined to sign the NPT because it 
felt the treaty was discriminatory and allowed the existing nuclear weapon states a 
 
                                                 
73 “Country Overview: India Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December, 2007, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2893.html (accessed March 2, 2010). 
74 “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org, April 28, 2005, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm (accessed March 2, 2010). 
75 “Country Overview: India Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
“Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
 45 
monopoly76.  India tested its first “peaceful nuclear explosive” in 1974, but it is 
not attributed as having deliverable nuclear arms until 1986-88.77  However, the 
series of 5 nuclear test detonations from May 11th 1998 to May 13th of the same 
year are what made the situation critical.  By that time, India had developed 
several ballistic missile types easily capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and 
has been a full nuclear weapon state since.78  However, Pakistan was ready for it, 
as it had been developing its own nuclear program since the 1970s, in response to 
India’s refusal to sign the NPT.  Initially, it had planned a nuclear test in 1977 in 
response to the Indian 1974 test, but that was cancelled.  It conducted its first 
“cold test” in 1983, and in 1988, Pakistan had several nuclear weapons 
constructed, but left disassembled.79  In 1998, Pakistan immediately picked up 
India’s thrown gauntlet and test-detonated at least two (possibly as many of six) 
nuclear weapons between May 28th and 30th, which put a stop to Indian talks of 
military action in Kashmir.80
 The drivers vary on both sides of the conflict.  In the Indian case, the 
typical driver for nuclear arms, security, is questionable.  In many cases, it is 
believed that India does not have any major security threats that would merit a 
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nuclear arsenal, including China.81  However, the Indians themselves claimed that 
it was motivated by security issues (namely the Pakistani nuclear program).82  
Interestingly enough, prestige appears to India’s lead driver in the initial 
development of its nuclear arms.  India’s belief that the NPT was discriminatory 
indicates that it felt that as long as nuclear weapons were a staple of the other 
great powers of the world, it could not be denied the same right.83  Another major 
driver appears to be technological, as it appears that the Indian scientific 
community was strongly in favor of creating nuclear arms.  Former Indian Prime 
Minister H.D. Deve Gowda was quoted as saying “the scientists had approached 
previous two governments to continue the tests, once in 1995 and in 1997.  
Gowda claimed that he had told them to wait, but the persistence of the Indian 
scientific community appears to have eventually led to the test.84  The Indians 
also claimed that scientific research was another reason for the 1998 nuclear 
tests.85  By contrast, the Pakistani nuclear program appears to be almost entirely 
security oriented.  There is no mention of Pakistan pursuing nuclear energy for 
economic purposes or to shore up domestic political support.  Developing its 
nuclear program cost Pakistan prestige, and technology was one of Pakistan’s 
chief barriers in the program.86
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Of course, chief among these is India.  Pakistan has declared its nuclear inventory 
to be for first strike use, to counter India’s far stronger conventional military.87  
Clearly, Pakistan still views India as its primary threat, as its arsenal has 
continued to grow along with India’s.88
 Even worse is the fact that there are very few barriers or disincentives that 
apply to either nuclear program.  Obviously, there are few if any foreign security 
barriers to either of these country’s nuclear programs.  This is particularly true in 
the Pakistani case, as the American strategic partnership with Pakistan in the War 
on Terror is widely known, in spite of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal.  There 
is little or no indication that either country’s economy is under strain due to their 
ongoing nuclear programs.  Technology does not seem to be an issue either, since 
both countries have fully fledged nuclear programs and have built (India) or are in 
the process of building (Pakistan) their own indigenous hydrogen bombs
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there should be few technology barriers at this point.  The domestic issue is likely 
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developments, especially in Pakistan.  Pakistan has a continuously growing 
domestic security problem with large numbers of Taliban and other Islamic 
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international concerns about the security of the Pakistani arsenal91
 Overall, India and Pakistan present a variety of serious hazards to both the 
nonproliferation regime and global security as a whole.  These two countries with 
decades of political and religious animosity have fought several conventional 
wars, and with both countries continuously building up and modernizing their 
nuclear forces, the potential for a cataclysmic regional conflict is present and 
increasing.  With India’s growing economic might and Pakistan’s strategic 
importance to the U.S. and its allies, such a nuclear war would have an enormous 
impact on world politics and economics.  Furthermore, growing terrorism and 
insurgency in both countries continues to increase the risk of nuclear weapon theft 
or black market sale.  Until both countries can engage each other peacefully and 
agree to dismantle their nuclear arms, both countries will remain grave liabilities 
to global nonproliferation. 
.  The arrest of 
A.Q. Khan in 2004 under charges of selling nuclear secrets is one of the 
penultimate examples of this.  While Indian domestic security and politics do not 
seem to be a major factor, it is worth remembering India has suffered a number of 
terrorist attacks over the past decade (such as the Mumbai attack in 2008).  
Therefore, the risk that a terrorist group might steal a nuclear weapon from India 
cannot be entirely ruled out. 
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Conclusions 
 From all of these cases, a number of conclusions can be drawn.  First and 
foremost, nearly all of these cases demonstrate that the need for regime survival 
seems to be the absolute root for the development of nuclear arms.  Pakistan’s 
case was a country developing nuclear arms for fear of being annihilated by its 
larger, more powerful neighbor.  North Korea’s is an attempt to stave off 
potentially regime crippling unrest from within and prevent (perceived) threats of 
American military action from abroad.  South Africa developed its program to 
defend against aggression from neighboring states and to stem the spread of 
Soviet influence in Africa.  All of these cases demonstrate these countries 
developing nuclear arms to prevent their regime from crumbling due to either 
internal or external threats.  These fall under the national security and the 
domestic politics drivers.  However, when it comes to getting these types of states  
to disarm, the most effective means appears to be crippling these countries 
economically and demonstrating the cooperative benefits they stand to reap from 
giving up their nuclear arsenals and rejoining the international community.  Both 
Libya and South Africa benefited tremendously from giving up their nuclear 
arms, economically and diplomatically.  Furthermore, both had come to the 
realization that the survival of their governments was facilitated by abandoning 
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their nuclear arms.  Libya in particular was becoming increasingly unstable prior 
to giving up its arsenal, suffering both attempted coups against Qaddafi and 
severe economic sanctions, which ended after Libya gave up its nuclear arms.  
These cases help determine both the likely motives for nuclear proliferators and 
the likely barriers to the continuation of a nuclear weapon development program. 
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Chapter V-Primary Case Study: Iran: 
National Actors 
 Inside Iran, there are two principle actors which affect the nuclear issue, 
which differ in their political orientation rather than professional affiliation or 
geographic location.  These are the two major factions in the Iranian political 
elite, and due to the fact that the elites.  The first of these are the pragmatic 
conservatives.  This is the more moderate faction in the Iranian political elite, and 
would be willing to normalize Iranian relations with the United States and the rest 
of the world.  They controlled the diplomatic negotiations over the Iranian nuclear 
program from 2003 to 2005, and were much less problematic for the U.N. and 
IAEA to negotiate with.  The pragmatists have been open to compromise, and 
have also been sensitive to international opinion and pressure.  This has made the 
pragmatic conservatives more open to international engagement and 
globalization.  While they do seek to expand Iran’s power and influence on the 
international stage, their willingness to compromise and negotiate would make 
them more amenable to a bargain on the nuclear issue.  Notable pragmatic 
conservatives include former President Rafsanjani and Hassan Rowhani (the 
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former lead negotiator to the U.S. and U.N. in 2004 and former secretary of the 
Supreme National Security Council).92
 The second principle actor inside the Iranian political elite is the 
Ideological Conservative faction.  This has been the dominant faction in Iranian 
politics since the 2005 election and represents thinking common to the early days 
of the Revolution.  This faction is characterized by militancy and paranoia, and 
sees the world through a Hobbesian perspective which dictates that military might 
is the only effective means of demonstrating power and influence international 
politics, and that “predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate” each other.  
Unfortunately, this means that most of its members subscribe to the idea that 
diplomacy is simply a means of interchange among actors in any balance of 
power, but does nothing to alter the balance.  Compromise on any issue is 
unlikely, and these ideologues seek to “impose Iran on the international 
community.”  Security guarantees are seen as insulting, international opinion and 
goodwill are irrelevant, and the sensitivity of the nuclear issue in Iran is seen as 
evidence of Iran’s rising power and geopolitical importance.  Furthermore, it 
currently enjoys support from both regular and irregular military elements, as well 
as the more conservative clergy.  Current President Ahmadinejad and Speaker of 
the Iranian Parliament Larijani are prominent examples of Ideological 
Conservatives.
 
93
                                                 
92 Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006), pg 32. 
 
93 Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, pgs. 32-34 
 53 
 It is important to note that these factions are not diametrically opposed, 
especially on the nuclear issue.  Both support a strong Iran, and both support 
Iran’s indigenous nuclear program.  The principle differences are in the 
perspectives of the international community and ideas on how Iran should interact 
with it.  The pragmatists seek to normalize relations with the rest of the world, 
and are open to compromise.  While they view the nuclear program as important, 
they are not willing to let Iran become an international pariah in the process.  The 
opposite is true for the ideological faction, which in fact favors a confrontation 
with the western powers.  This group sees a confrontation as a means to divide the 
West from states like Russia and China, and that Iran’s oil revenues and 
geopolitical importance give them a number of options in that scenario.  If the 
United States is to have any chance of resolving this issue diplomatically, it 
appears more and more that it will have to try and interact with the pragmatic 
elements of the Iranian elite as much as possible.  If the ideologues retain the most 
power, it is highly unlikely that a diplomatic solution will be viable.94
 
 
External/International Actors 
 The first major international actor in the standoff with Iran is the United 
States.  The American position regarding the Iranian nuclear program has been 
vociferous, repeatedly stating that any development of nuclear arms has been 
unacceptable.  Iran has also been squarely in Washington’s sights since the 
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revision of its policies regarding the control of WMD proliferation.  The Bush 
administration shifted the American focus from controlling the technologies 
involved in the production of nuclear arms to the identities of countries 
involved.95  The most obvious results of this policy were the invasion of Iraq and 
the statement that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea had formed an “Axis of Evil”.  It 
also increased U.S. reliance on unilateral intervention in these cases, calling into 
question American willingness to work with its allies abroad on the proliferation 
issue.  The other problem was that foreign policy makers have viewed Iranian 
regional ambitions as entirely antithetical to American strategic objectives in the 
Middle East.  However, the overall American response has repeatedly wavered 
between a hard-line policy of a totally nuclear-free Iran and occasional 
willingness to negotiate.  However, the inability of the Bush Administration to 
turn either approach into any meaningful results has critically hampered 
Washington’s ability to deal with Tehran today.  This has been compounded by 
the special antipathy the Bush administration reserved for Tehran, which has 
translated both into a widespread social distrust of Iran by American citizens and 
lack of any proposed incentives to Iran for halting its nuclear program.96
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President Obama has been taking steps to show American willingness to 
negotiate, which has even started getting some Chinese willingness to discuss 
measures against Iran.  However, it is becoming clear that he still favors targeted 
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sanctions, and it appears unlikely that he will relent on preventing or limiting 
Iran’s nuclear program until it gives up its enrichment facilities.97
 The next principal actor in the growing tensions with Tehran is Israel.  As 
the target of Tehran’s anti-Semitic rhetoric, the only existing nuclear power in the 
Middle East, and arguably the least stable element in the dispute over Iran’s 
nuclear program, Israel bears special mention.  Under the leadership of Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Israel has adopted a hard line posture towards Iran and has repeatedly 
warned of the growing threat of a nuclear Iran.  Moreover, there is growing 
popular support in Israel for preempting the Iranian nuclear program, regardless 
of the consequences.
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capability and whether Israel feels it can depend on Washington for assistance.  If 
Israel feels that the United States is unreliable or unwilling to help, the more 
likely they are to lash out on their own.99
 The next major actor involved in the dispute is the EU-3.  This is the 
designation for the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and they typically 
represent the EU in matters of major foreign policy.  These states have been 
critical in maintaining the diplomatic avenues into Tehran on the nuclear issue, 
especially during the earlier years of the Bush administration, and have tended to 
play the “good cop” to America’s “bad cop.”  Like the Americans, the EU-3 view 
the complete discontinuation of Iran’s full fuel cycle pursuit as the goal, and that 
freedom and democratization are the best means to achieve this.  However, the 
EU-3 viewed the nuclear program as the problem, rather than the American view 
that the regime was to blame.
 
100  However, EU-3 relations with Tehran began 
deteriorating in 2005, following Tehran’s dismissal of the EU’s package deal 
offer and the election of President Ahmedinejad.  The new Iranian President’s 
comments about the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist resulted in an outright 
condemnation from the EU, and following Iran’s resumption of enrichment 
research in early 2006 the EU-3 stated that the differences were not “between Iran 
and Europe, but between Iran and the entire international community.”101
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Furthermore, the EU-3 states are members of the G-8, all of whom came out for 
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stronger sanctions against Iran at the March 2010 G-8 summit.  These sanctions 
are expected to be enacted in the weeks following the summit, provided the UN 
Security Council approves.102
 The same is not necessarily true for the final two major state actors in the 
dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.  These are Russia and China, both of whom 
have traditionally been Tehran’s major business partners.  They have also been 
the biggest obstacle to American sanctions on Iran (particularly during the Bush 
administration), and have observed a pragmatic relationship with Tehran.  Iran 
has not made issue of Russian and Chinese suppression of Muslim minorities in 
their countries, and this is one of the reasons for this continued partnership.
  This latest international consensus shows that 
exasperation with Iran is no longer a strictly American phenomenon, and that the 
Western states are becoming more united on the issue. 
103
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Moscow in particular has maintained strong ties with Tehran since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, and have become one the principal suppliers of arms to Iran (in 
exchange for much needed hard currency).  Russia has also been at the forefront 
of efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue in Iran.  The Russian 
position vis-à-vis Iran became more in line with the EU-3 during the 2003-2005 
period, seeking diplomatic means to resolve the dispute, but making absolutely 
clear that the acquisition of nuclear arms by Iran is unacceptable.  The most 
notable Russian proposal was for Russia to enrich Iranian uranium on Russian 
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/30/world/international-us-g8-
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soil, to prevent or at least delay Iran from developing its own enrichment 
ability.104  However, this deal was not implemented, and recently, Russia has been 
falling more and more in line with the American and EU policy regarding Iran, 
and has even become more in favor of targeted sanction against Iran’s nuclear 
program.  However, the Russians have made clear that they do not favor regime 
change or sanctions that would disproportionately affect ordinary Iranian citizens.  
Furthermore, Lukoil (Russia’s largest private oil firm) recently cancelled a 
contract in Iran, citing the effects of sanctions.  It even appears that China is 
becoming somewhat more open to the prospect of sanctions on Iran, as the Iranian 
program becomes more difficult to ignore and Tehran becomes more obstinate.105
 The final important actor in the Iranian nuclear dispute is the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.  This is the U.N. agency dedicated to the responsible use 
of nuclear energy and materials throughout the world.  Specifically, the IAEA 
uses a variety of inspections (namely ad hoc, routine, special, and safeguards 
inspections).  It can also use a variety of additional means to verify the nature of a 
given nuclear program, such as collecting environmental samples, use of 
  
If the development of a nuclear capability exhausts the goodwill of these two 
powerful states, Iran will likely find itself utterly isolated and with almost no 
strategic partners, either inside or outside the Middle East. 
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remote/unmanned devices to monitor a given facility, and the ability to request 
any and all relevant data from the host government.106 Although this agency has 
been responsible for inspecting Tehran’s nuclear industry, there have been a 
number of serious hurdles getting the agency involved in the Tehran issue.  The 
processes used in the creation of the nuclear fuel cycle are dual use technologies, 
as either can be used for the creation of fuel for nuclear reactors or for production 
of weapons grade uranium.  This allows Iran to take advantage of the IAEA’s 
mandate to promote the use of peaceful nuclear technology, while still retaining 
the ability to construct a nuclear weapon and withdraw from the NPT on short 
notice if the need arises.  The amount of bureaucratic wrangling and 
brinksmanship on the part of the Iranians has also balked the IAEA, and has thus 
far only gotten aggressive about verification and inspections after vigorous 
American pressure.  However, the agency’s independent nature allowed it to 
portray itself as an independent entity, which was interested in both Iran’s right to 
free energy and satisfying the concerns of the international community.107
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However, it appears that even the good will of the IAEA is nearing exhaustion on 
the Iran issue, especially after the exposure of the secret enrichment facility near 
Qom.  According to the most recent IAEA resolution, the agency has found Iran 
to be in violation of multiple sections of the Safeguards Agreement, including the 
resumption of enrichment activities, failure to declare its nuclear facilities, and 
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has remained highly uncooperative with the agency.  The report recommends that 
the Director General of the IAEA report these events to the U.N. Security 
Council, which has undoubtedly continued to cast Iran in a negative light since.108
 
 
Drivers for Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 The principal driver for the Iranian nuclear program is generally accepted 
to be prestige.  Like North Korea, Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons (or 
at least a nuclear option) as a means of demonstrating its independence and its 
ability to increase influence in the Middle East.  Another major factor is Iran’s 
penchant for vitriolic anti-American sentiment and support for extremist 
organizations in the Middle East.  Development of an indigenous nuclear program 
would cripple American ability to provide security guarantees and general ability 
to conduct foreign policy.109  Furthermore, Iran has repeatedly stated its intention 
to become the hegemonic power in the Middle East, and become indispensable to 
any and all affairs and regional policies in the Middle East.  To do this, they seek 
to exploit American entanglement in the region and use a nuclear capability as 
leverage over both the United States and the other regional powers.110
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and gaining international prestige, and they clearly view their nuclear program as 
a means to achieve this. 
 The second driver for the Iranian nuclear program is said to be domestic 
politics.  The Iranian government regularly touts the nuclear program to its 
citizenry as both a symbol of national pride and (more importantly) a major 
source of continued legitimacy for the current crop of Ideological Conservative 
leaders.  The current regime is utilizing the program to tap into nationalist 
sentiment and present the full nuclear fuel cycle as something “no self-respecting 
nation can go without.”111  The Iranian government continually cites high public 
support for nuclear energy as the reason for its continued nuclear development.  
The Iranian government has used the issue as evidence that the rest of the world 
seeks to deny Iran access to any advanced technologies, and continually reinforce 
Iran’s need for a nuclear program in the eyes of its citizens.112  It has also been 
suggested that the recent upheavals following the 2009 presidential elections in 
Iran might be impetus to increase the pace on its nuclear program, so as to show 
off its nuclear prize and revive the waning political support of the ideological 
conservatives.113
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demonstrated similar behavior during the development of its nuclear program.  
This could mean that as the Islamic Republic’s domestic political situation 
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deteriorates the pace of the Iranian nuclear program could be accelerated in a 
desperate bid to keep the regime (or at least the ideological faction) in power. 
 Technology is the favored public driver of the Iranian government, as the 
Iranian government repeatedly states its right to nuclear energy and all portions of 
the nuclear fuel cycle.  The Iranian government regularly legitimates its pursuit of 
nuclear energy as the cornerstone of Iranian national and scientific progress, as 
well as a demonstration of its ability to develop nuclear technology in spite of all 
international objections.114  As to whether there is a large scientific lobby in Iran 
pushing for the development of nuclear technology, there is no apparent evidence 
that the scientific community in Iran has any influence on the policy makers.  
Available material suggests that the Iranian mullahs and political elites are the 
primary authorities pushing for the development of the nuclear program.115  In 
terms of its technological infrastructure, Iran is becoming dangerously close to the 
nuclear threshold.  Recent reporting suggests that Iran’s enrichment program is 
now capable of producing 19.75% Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which is the 
most significant hurdle in the enrichment process.  After reaching this point, 
further enriching it to Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is considered to be a 
simple exercise.  If this is correct, Iran could produce enough material for a 
nuclear weapon by 2011 or 2012.116
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the call for technological progress by the regime, technology remains a strong 
driver for the Iranian nuclear program. 
 Perversely, security seems to be one of the lesser drivers for the Iranian 
nuclear program.  Regionally speaking, Iran has very few local security threats to 
deal with, and none of them would require a nuclear deterrent.  Even Israel, a 
current nuclear power, is only likely to present a threat to Iran as long as the 
Iranian government continues to combine its insistence on a nuclear program with 
its denial of Israel’s right to exist.  It is quite clear that Tehran views the United 
States as its primary adversary.  Furthermore, the strong U.S. presence in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan has added to Iran’s threat perception in recent years, fearing 
a permanent U.S. presence that could lead to Iran’s permanent isolation.117  It is 
also generally accepted that acquiring nuclear arms would essentially put Iran off-
limits to a regime change or invasion, but would do little else to enhance Iran’s 
regional security.118
 As for the last of Cirincione’s drivers, economics does not appear 
significant in the pursuit of a nuclear program for Iran.  There is no apparent 
evidence that there would be an appreciable economic benefit for Tehran, whether 
from the generation of nuclear energy to the sale of HEU (or indeed completed 
nuclear weapons)
  In all, Iran has little objective rationale to call its security a 
significant driver for its nuclear program. 
119
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borders, so the Iranian nuclear industry would still be dependent on uranium 
imports, which negates any arguments for Iranian nuclear self-sufficiency (and 
casts doubt on the intents of the development of the full fuel cycle in Iran).120
 
  
Economic drivers are very minor, and should not be considered to be a major 
incentive for Iran to develop its nuclear industry. 
Barriers to the Iranian Nuclear Program 
 Unfortunately, Iran has circumvented the most common barrier to 
achieving a nuclear fuel cycle, and this is technology.  Early on, Iran had required 
significant outside technical assistance to begin construction of its nuclear plant at 
Bushehr, and it is widely accepted that Iran acquired its enrichment centrifuges 
though the black market.  By this point, however, Iran has managed to construct 
several enrichment facilities (such as those at Natanz and Qom), and it appears to 
have sufficient technical know-how to maintain and possibly even improve the 
centrifuges they have acquired or manufactured.121  Furthermore, the nuclear 
plant at Bushehr is slated to finally begin operating in the summer of 2010, which 
would firmly cement Iran’s nuclear capability.122
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  If Iran’s ability to create LEU 
at Natanz can also be confirmed, the operation of Bushehr with fuel enriched at 
Natanz or Qom would firmly cement Iran as a nuclear state.  Therefore, 
technology is no longer a significant barrier to the Iranian nuclear program. 
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 Interestingly, probably the greatest existing barrier to the Iranian nuclear 
program is security.  Iran is bringing extreme security risks onto itself by insisting 
on the fuel cycle and the continuation of its nuclear program.  Chief among these 
is Israel.  Israel is commonly accepted as the country that is most likely to strike 
Iran over its nuclear issue, since Israel regards this program as an existential 
threat, particularly from a state that denies Israel’s right to exist.  Whether Iran 
actually intends to destroy Israel with atomic arms is becoming less relevant; the 
Israeli public is becoming increasingly convinced that they are, and are becoming 
increasingly vocal in their demands for a preemptive strike.  Eventually, it may 
come to pass that Israel will strike Iran due to public outcry even if the United 
States and the Israeli Mossad try to restrain such a strike.123  The other principal 
security risk to Iran resulting from its nuclear program is the United States itself.  
The American stance regarding Iran has been clear: Iran must cease its uranium 
enrichment and submit to IAEA inspections on its nuclear program.124  
Furthermore, the election of President Obama has done little to weaken the 
American stance on the issue.  As of March 2010 the President is pressing for 
tougher sanctions on Iran, and is working diligently to bring Russia and China in 
closer to the American position.125
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seems unlikely that the United States is going to put the use of force off the table 
entirely. 
 Economics will also provide a significant barrier to the Iranian nuclear 
program.  This is especially true in regards to Iran’s supply of uranium.  Iran is 
not self-sufficient in uranium mining, and probably will not be so until after 2015 
at least.126  This leaves a critical weakness in the Iranian nuclear program and 
makes the Iranian nuclear program very vulnerable to having its supplies of 
uranium cut off in the short term (either directly or through denial of hard 
currency through sanctions).  The potential effects of sanctions are also not 
something that can be underestimated, especially if Russia and China sign off on 
them in the UNSC.  There are already signs that the growing international 
pressure is starting to have an effect on investments in Iran.  Lukoil’s pullout from 
the Anaran oil field in Iran is an important indicator that Iran is becoming 
unpalatable to foreign investors.  Although Russian state firm Gazprom has 
picked up the Anaran contract, a shift of private foreign direct investment out of 
Iran should have a major effect on the country and its nuclear program.127
 Tehran clearly views the nuclear program as a means of enhancing its 
international prestige, but both historical precedent and recent changes in the 
international political climate suggest that the reverse effect is the more likely.  
Iran is more likely to find itself totally isolated and considered a rogue state in 
every sense of the term.  South Africa found itself in the same situation (as stated 
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earlier) and was cooperatively sanctioned by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.128  South Africa was treated as a pariah for the entirety of its nuclear-
armed period and did not gain international prestige and respect until it 
unilaterally disarmed its arsenal.  Additionally, Russia and China are becoming 
more open to sanctions on Iran, particularly if they develop nuclear arms, and 
developing nuclear weapons would likely isolate Iran from these two important 
supporters.129  If Iran finds itself in this situation, it will find itself alienated and 
without any foreign influence to peddle.  It will most likely be unable to affect 
major policies in the neighboring states, which both distrust Iran and are likely to 
turn to the United States for security.130
 Finally, the domestic politics issue could end up being the barrier that 
ultimately brings down the Iranian nuclear program.  The Iranian government 
regularly flaunts the overwhelming public support for the nuclear program as 
evidence that it must proceed with its nuclear program.  However, the government 
ignores or obfuscates many of the facts regarding public support of the program.  
While 80% of the Iranian public supports Iranian nuclear program, most of the 
Iranian public also do not support nuclear development if it isolates Iran like 
  Therefore, international prestige may be 
considered a driver from the perspective of the Iranian government, but from a 
more objective standpoint it should be considered a barrier, since Iran stands to 
lose a great deal of international standing by proceeding with its nuclear program. 
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North Korea has been.  Iranian citizens do not support the nuclear program if it 
detracts from domestic political needs, and appear unwilling to endure the same 
economic consequences that Pakistan and North Korea have suffered as results of 
their nuclear ambitions.131
 
  The riots following the rigged elections in 2009 
demonstrate the inherent instability and potential for unrest in Iran if the public 
feels disenfranchised by the government.  If the Iranian public eventually comes 
to feel that the nuclear program puts their interests at risk, then there is the 
possibility of further unrest.  The question then will be if the current political 
elites choose to adapt to its citizens demands or if reforms will be necessary. 
Conclusions 
 Given that Iran faces a much greater number of barriers towards 
developing a nuclear program instead of drivers, it seems apparent that the Iranian 
government is bent on having its nuclear industry, regardless of the costs at home 
and abroad.  The continuing breakdowns in relations between Iran and the 
Western countries show the growing indifference of Tehran to global opinion, and 
Iranian refusals to accept fuel deals proposed even by long-time business partner 
Russia illustrate the level of importance Iran places on attaining the complete 
nuclear fuel cycle.  While moderate elements do exist in Iran that would likely be 
amenable to a compromise, as long as the ideologues remain in power Iran is 
unlikely to make any sort of concessions on its nuclear program, which greatly 
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reduces any chance of a diplomatic resolution before Iran gains a nuclear 
capability.  When compared to the historical examples stated above, very few of 
the factors that resulted in positive outcomes such as South Africa and Libya are 
present.  Unlike the Libyans, Iran has not been sufficiently isolated to make 
negotiations effective, nor has it been offered any significant incentives to 
abandon its nuclear program (those that have been proposed are usually dismissed 
by the ideologues dismiss as insulting).  Unlike South Africa, Iran has no ongoing 
regional conflict that would warrant a nuclear arsenal, although their concerns 
regarding American encirclement could be considered analogous to South African 
concerns about growing Soviet influence in Africa. 
Of the NPT failures, Iran bears the most resemblance to India and North 
Korea.  It does not mandate nuclear arms for deterrence like Pakistan does.  
Similar to North Korea, Iran does seek recognition as a regional power player 
through its nuclear program, but Iran tends to be more pragmatic in its policy than 
North Korea.  Also like North Korea, Iran likely views its nuclear program as a 
means of legitimizing the current leadership of the Islamic Republic.   However, 
Iran’s main argument is that it has the right to nuclear technology and the full 
nuclear fuel cycle, and that the existing nuclear powers are conspiring to prevent 
this.  Lack of punishment in the cases of India, Pakistan, and North Korea may be 
encouraging the Iranian effort as well.  If Iran is going to be deterred from its 
nuclear ambitions, it has to be shown that those developments will not go 
unpunished. 
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Chapter VI-Conclusions: 
 Iran’s current determination to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle in the face of 
all international opinion and demands for transparency provide a strong refutation 
to this work’s central hypothesis: A diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear 
dispute remains unlikely, barring a major shift in Iranian politics or government.  
If the moderates in the Iranian political elite can regain the more prominent 
political roles, a deal might be possible.  The common consensus is that the 
Iranian nuclear program has reached a point where even a military intervention 
will only be able to delay the Iranian program rather than destroy it.132
 If this is the case, why does Iran, like North Korea, choose to pursue this 
program when doing defies all conventional logic?  Iran stands to lose a great deal 
from continuing its pursuit of the full fuel cycle, from allies and prestige to hard 
currency and military support, with few real concrete benefits from developing 
the program.  Even ideology and the historic animosity between the leadership of 
the Islamic Republic and the Western states do not explain pursuing a program 
that offers such a poor cost-to-benefit ratio.  Yet this trend seems to be becoming 
more common, as both Iran and North Korea are pursuing their nuclear programs 
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in the face of fierce opposition from abroad.  The answer appears to reside within 
of Cirinicione’s fifth driver: Domestic politics, and more specifically, regime 
survival.  Both Iran and North Korea have tenuous regimes, which both rely on 
deception of the public through huge amounts of propaganda, military strength, 
and use of force against dissidents to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their 
citizens.  Both governments tout their nuclear programs as a vital national interest, 
and blame the rest of the international community for their internal problems.  
The Korean case in particular demonstrates a society that has been forced to 
accept famine and crushing poverty for a nuclear program, believing that their 
country will be invaded and annihilated without them.   
Iran’s circumstance is better in some ways, but more tenuous in others.  
As it stands, Iran still retains a great deal of international business and its citizens 
are nowhere near as impoverished as those in North Korea.  However, Iranian 
citizens are far more educated than those in the DPRK, and are both aware of 
what has happened to the people of North Korea and unwilling to let the same 
happen to them.  For this reason, Tehran has no choice but to walk an extremely 
delicate tightrope.  They must continue their nuclear program to gain their nuclear 
option and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people, but they must 
maintain enough plausible deniability about the nature program to avoid global 
sanctions (or a military intervention) from the international community.  It seems 
clear that Tehran believes that any deviation from this course could bring the 
downfall of the ideological faction, or even the Islamic Republic as a whole. 
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This brings this study to an important realization regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program, and more importantly, a major insight as to the main motivations of 
potential proliferation states.  During the course of this study, all of the states that 
chose to produce nuclear arms (with the possible exception of India) all had a 
common characteristic: they were deemed as absolutely critical to the survival of 
the government at the time.  Pakistan viewed nuclear arms as a dire necessity to 
prevent an assault by a nuclear armed India.  South Africa initially produced its 
nuclear arms to deter aggressors on its borders and expanding Soviet influence in 
Africa.  Both North Korea and Iran appear to be pursuing their programs to 
legitimize their regimes domestically and deter potential enemies abroad.  By 
contrast, both Libya and South Africa gave up their weapons programs once it 
became clear that those weapons were greater threats to their national security 
than guarantors of it.  Regime survival appears to be the most critical 
driver/barrier of all when it comes to nuclear arms, whether it is survival against 
external threats or internal dissent. 
With it becoming evident that the Iranian program has likely progressed 
too far to stop and that Iran views the attainment of the full fuel cycle as critical to 
its survival both at home and abroad, the main hypothesis of this work appears to 
have been proven.  In spite of all costs and potential risks, Iran pursues its 
program with single-minded determination, out of the belief that the completion 
of their nuclear industry is necessary to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of 
their public and demonstrate Iran’s might to the Middle East.  Similar experiences 
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with North Korea, South Africa, and Pakistan reinforce this finding.  If a regime 
believes that its survival can be guaranteed by a nuclear program, it is liable to 
pursue that program until either it brings that program to fruition, or until it 
becomes evident that possessing nuclear arms is a greater risk to that regime’s 
survival than not having them. 
If the ideologues believe that the current course with the nuclear program 
has to be maintained for the sake of the survival of their regime, this will make 
the negotiation of a diplomatic settlement nearly impossible.  This is especially 
true when combined with the ideologues’ intrinsic animosity towards the United 
States and indifference to global opinion.  With this in mind, it appears that the 
best strategy for the United States to implement in this scenario is a two phase 
plan.  The first phase involves delaying the Iranian nuclear program by covert 
methods as much as possible.  This is combined with outreach efforts to the 
moderates in the Iranian government and attempts to demonstrate to Iranian 
citizens the inherent dangers involved in pursuing the full fuel cycle.  The goal is 
to delay the nuclear fuel cycle program from being completed until more 
moderate/pragmatic actors can return to prominence in the Islamic Republic, 
while retaining a measure of plausible deniability for the United States.  Finally, 
the U.S. has to keep Israel restrained and prevent it from launching a preemptive 
strike.   
 However, the United States needs to anticipate that a more moderate 
faction may not be elected in the near future in Iran, and that Iran’s nuclear 
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program could be completed during that time.  The second phase involves 
containment of Iran after having declared full nuclear fuel cycle capability and 
preventing the crisis from escalating into a regional nuclear standoff.  Deterrence 
of Iranian regional and nuclear ambitions in this scenario is the key component of 
this type of containment.  Deterrence may seem difficult to enforce against a state 
like Iran, but works like After Iran Gets the Bomb by James Lindsay and Ray 
Takeyh demonstrate several effective means for the United States to limit Iranian 
attempts to exploit its nuclear gains.  This work also discusses the policy options 
to be avoided by the United States if Iran gets a nuclear option, in addition to 
mitigating the inevitable damage done to confidence in American defense 
guarantees to regional states and its ability to keep Iran under control. 
 
Proposed Policy Plan 
Creating a foreign policy framework should be based upon the idea that 
regime survival is the most important factor in the continued development of a 
nuclear program.  Therefore, a regime that views its survival as threatened (either 
from within or without) is likely to push for the completion of a nuclear program, 
and is more likely to abandon the program once it realizes that there is much to be 
gained from cooperation with the international community.  This is especially 
likely in the Iranian case, as Tehran is known to be a fairly pragmatic actor in 
regards to many of its politics.  In order to do business with Russia and China, 
Tehran ignores the oppression of ethnic Muslim minorities in either country, and 
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in spite of its inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and Israel, it has 
taken great pains to not directly provoke either.  This suggests that the Islamic 
Republic can be considered a rational enough actor to be subject to this sort of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
However, until Tehran can be shown to have fully completed their fuel 
cycle and are capable of producing weapons grade uranium, American options are 
rather limited.  At best, the United States can try to delay the program through 
diplomatic and covert methods until the moderates can return to power in Tehran.  
The latter method in particular has proven effective, by enticing Iranian nuclear 
scientists to defect to the United States and by seeding the black market with 
defective centrifuge parts to delay Iranian progress in establishing their 
enrichment plants. 133
However, American options expand considerably after Iran has completed 
its fuel cycle.  Granted, the United States will have lost a significant amount of 
diplomatic credibility, especially with the other states of the Middle East, but it 
  However, unless the moderate faction can regain power in 
Iranian politics quickly, it is unlikely that delaying the program in this manner 
will buy sufficient amounts of time.  Given the distributed nature of the Iranian 
program, it is generally accepted that even a preemptive military strike will only 
delay the Iranian efforts, and would likely galvanize support for the ideological 
faction in Tehran. 
                                                 
133 Julian Borger, 'Missing Iranian Nuclear Scientist 'Resettled' in the US', Guardian, March 31, 
2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/mar/31/iran-
nuclear-weapons (accessed April 4, 2010). 
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should still be possible to reign in the situation as long as the U.S. acts 
responsibly and decisively.  This is also the best time to demonstrate to Iran the 
extreme costs of pursuing the program, and there are a number of ways to perform 
this.  Considering that prestige and economics appear to be the best means of 
inducing a country to give up a nuclear capability, these should form the 
cornerstone of all U.S. efforts.  Iran would need to be utterly isolated politically 
from as many dealings in the Middle East as possible.  Attempts to promote 
regional integration on security and economic issues in the Middle East should be 
made, with the deliberate exclusion of Tehran.  The development of a full fuel 
cycle would likely cause Russia and China to sever their ties with Iran, which 
would aid in the implementation of sanctions, and would alienate Iran from its 
principal providers of armaments and foreign investment.  Cutting off supplies of 
foreign uranium to Iran would also starve their fledgling nuclear industry of fuel, 
further crippling the program.  One suggestion that has merit (but is also highly 
ambitious) is the deliberate inclusion of Syria in the Israeli/Palestinian peace 
process, again deliberately excluding Tehran. 134
                                                 
134 Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” pgs. 45-47. 
  Finally, efforts should be made 
to inform the citizens of Iran of the problems caused by the single-minded pursuit 
of nuclear energy by the ideological faction.  The growing amount of 
technological prowess among Iranian citizens, especially among dissidents and 
protestors, makes the delivery of information to the Iranian populace that much 
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more expedient. 135
However, there are two important caveats to this scenario.  The first of 
these is that the United States must prevent Israel from launching a preemptive 
attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities, and refrain from doing so itself.  It is 
widely accepted that an Israeli first-strike would do more harm than good, merely 
delaying the Iranian program and uniting the Iranian citizens under the banner of 
the ideological faction.  If the regime survival approach is to work, Iran cannot be 
provided with a means to unify its populace against an outside aggressor.  On the 
other hand, however, the United States should be prepared to use force against 
Iran in the event that Iran does complete its fuel cycle (or even develop actual 
nuclear arms).  Clearly, this should be a last resort scenario, but if Iran begins 
using its nuclear card as a means to act belligerently to its neighboring states 
(either through threat of terrorism, conventional attack, or nuclear attack) the 
United States needs to be prepared to act appropriately.  Also necessary to 
  Communities of Iranian expatriates should be considered to 
aid in this particular effort.  The goal is to demonstrate to Tehran that the costs of 
its program are indeed far higher than they think, and to demonstrate that if they 
continue with the nuclear program, the security of their regime will be threatened, 
either from internal dissidents or external states.  In the end, the idea is to either 
cause the regime to fold on the nuclear issue and ensure its own survival, or cause 
its downfall and bring about the election of a more moderate national actor. 
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2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21cohenweb.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Iran%20
protest%20communications&st=cse (accessed April 4, 2010). 
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utilizing the regime survival method is containing Iran in this case, eliminating 
the belief that they can use the threat of force as regional leverage after gaining 
their nuclear option (or weapons). 136
 
 
Closing Comments 
 This study has come to the conclusion that a strictly diplomatic solution 
with the Iranian government is unlikely under the current circumstances, and with 
the completion of Iran’s fuel cycle considered only a matter of time, American 
options are becoming increasingly limited.  However, the research does suggest 
that a military solution is not a necessity either.  Delaying the Iranian program 
through covert means could delay the program for enough time until the 
moderates in the Iranian political apparatus can return to power.  If this happens, 
the United States should not hesitate to reopen negotiations on the nuclear issue.  
These methods could also help prevent an Israeli preemptive strike, which would 
likely have a severe regional backlash.  However, the United States should also 
not hesitate to act decisively if Iran gains a nuclear capability or actually builds a 
nuclear weapon.  It must be made clear immediately that Iran’s development of 
nuclear capability is absolutely unacceptable, and containment/reduction of 
Iranian regional influence should prove to Tehran the inherent risks of possessing 
a nuclear capability.  As long as it is made clear that possession of nuclear arms 
will pose a greater threat to Iran’s future than having them, Iran is likely to back 
                                                 
136 Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” pgs. 42-45. 
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off.  A military response by the United States and the other Western states is 
something that should be avoided as much as possible, but the U.S. should not 
hesitate to employ a military response if Iran becomes too aggressive as a result of 
its nuclear capability.  Finally, the United States has to make clear that any further 
development of nuclear arms in the Middle East is absolutely unacceptable, and 
be ready to cut off aid to any partner states in the Middle East that consider 
building or buying their own nuclear arms.  If the United States acts both 
decisively and responsibly, a nuclear Iran need not escalate into a doomsday 
scenario in the Middle East. 
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